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Abstract 
 Investors, managers and shareholders benefit from the study of what influences 
and determines corporate effective tax rates (ETRs) as this analysis may contribute to 
potential tax savings. Moreover, standard setters, regulators and policy makers have a 
crucial interest in identifying the main factors driving corporate taxes. Therefore, the 
purpose of our investigation and contribution is twofold. Firstly, we provide evidence of 
how ETRs are determined by firms’ financial and operational characteristics. Secondly, 
our objective is to show the role of Corporate Governance attributes in explaining ETRs. 
As the literature about this topic using non-US firms is not abundant, to address these 
questions we select a sample of 704 non-financial firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange between 2010 and 2013. We estimate our econometric model on two different 
ETR measures by using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights.  
Our results show that larger and more profitable firms have higher ETRs. On the 
contrary, capital intensity, leverage and R&D expenses have a negative impact on ETRs. 
These findings are as foreseen in extant literature. Regarding ownership structure and 
board composition, our findings reveal that managerial ownership contributes to lower 
ETRs. On the other hand, more independent firms from controlling shareholders exhibit 
higher ETRs. Moreover, a larger number of board members and non-executive directors 
results in higher ETRs. Our investigation is relevant, given the importance of ETRs to 
firms’ strategic investment decisions and due to its impact on firms’ bottom line 
performance. 
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Resumo 
Investidores, gestores e acionistas beneficiam do estudo sobre os fatores que 
influenciam e determinam a taxa de imposto efetiva (ETR). A análise dos fatores que 
influenciam e determinam a ETR pode contribuir para significativas poupanças de 
imposto. Adicionalmente, analistas, políticos, legisladores e reguladores têm interesse na 
análise dos principais fatores da ETR. Deste modo, a nossa investigação tem dois 
principais objetivos. Primeiramente, pretendemos evidenciar de que forma as ETRs são 
determinadas pelas características financeiras e operacionais específicas de cada empresa. 
Em segundo lugar, o nosso propósito é realçar o papel desempenhado pelas características 
relacionadas com o Governo das Sociedades na explicação das ETRs. Com o intuito de 
analisar as questões propostas acima, selecionamos um conjunto de 704 empresas cotadas 
na Bolsa de Valores de Londres, pois grande parte dos estudos sobre este tema são 
essencialmente focados na análise das empresas norte americanas. Efetuamos a nossa 
análise para o período de 2010 a 2013. Na estimação do nosso modelo econométrico 
utilizamos duas variáveis distintas para medir a ETR. Os modelos são estimados com 
recurso à utilização do método Generalized Least Squares com ponderação cross-section 
e inclusão de variáveis binárias anuais para consideração dos efeitos fixos temporais. Os 
resultados obtidos evidenciam que empresas de maior dimensão e mais rentáveis 
apresentam maiores taxas de imposto efetivas. Opostamente, a intensidade capitalística, 
o endividamento e o investimento em I&D contribuem para menores ETRs. 
Relativamente à influência da estrutura acionista e à composição do Conselho de 
Administração, os nossos resultados demonstram que a detenção de ações por parte dos 
órgãos de gestão tem um impacto negativo na ETR. Por outro lado, uma estrutura 
acionista mais concentrada traduz-se em maiores taxas de imposto efetivas. 
Adicionalmente, empresas com Conselhos de Administração de maior dimensão e com 
uma maior proporção de diretores não-executivos revelam ETRs mais elevadas. A 
relevância da nossa investigação deve-se à importância da taxa de imposto efetiva para a 
tomada das decisões de investimento. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at giving a contribution to the extant literature on the determinants 
of effective tax rates (ETRs). Our particular focus is on the impact of a firm’s financial 
and operational specific characteristics and Corporate Governance mechanisms on ETRs. 
Corporate tax rate is an instrument of fiscal policies. Ever more the choice and 
establishment of the statutory tax rate is on the main agenda of governments. It is well 
known that taxes are an important source of revenue in order to states develop their public 
policies. However, the willingness to increase statutory taxes in order to satisfy that 
purpose has been somewhat constrained by other important aspects such as the relevance 
of corporate taxation to the attractiveness of foreign investment. Therefore, investigations 
concerning the analysis of which factors may influence the taxes paid by firms are useful 
for regulators and policy makers and contribute to the definition of domestic tax systems. 
If taxes are a significant element for macroeconomic policies they are no less 
important for firms’ strategic decisions. As well documented by Graham (2003) effective 
tax rates can affect corporate decision making and other related aspects such as capital 
structure, payout policy and risk management. Taxes are ever more viewed as an 
enhancing component of bottom line firms’ performance. Robinson et al. (2010) show 
that evaluate a firm’s tax department as a “profit centre” is associated with lower effective 
tax rates than if it was categorized as a “cost centre”. Therefore, any reduction of taxes 
paid contributes to an increase of earnings disclosed in the financial statements. 
Considering that the main purpose of firms’ activity should be creating value to 
shareholders, actions to minimize the tax burden are in line with that objective. According 
to this perspective, we examine whether firms’ specific characteristics are determinants 
of effective tax rates. We follow a similar approach to the one used by Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) and, more recently, by Kraft (2014) to estimate the impact of firms’ 
characteristics on ETRs. Many studies have paid attention to the influence of firms’ 
specific characteristics on ETRs (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006; Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon et al., 2010; Minick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al. 
2012). Following previous literature we are interested in the influence of size, 
profitability, capital structure and asset mix composition on effective tax rates. We expect 
those variables to be related to firms’ tax expense. Tax expense or tax income is defined 
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in the IAS 12 (IASB, 2010) as “the aggregate amount included in the determination of 
profit or loss for the period in respect of current tax and deferred tax”. To compute 
effective tax rate, in the first instance, we divide tax income to pre-tax income. As a 
second measure of effective tax rate we use the ratio of tax expense to cash flow from 
operations (Richardson and Lanis, 2007).  
Apart from financial and operational performance as determinants of ETRs, the 
second part of our investigation focus on how Corporate Governance mechanisms 
influence effective tax rates, specifically, we are interested in the analysis of ownership 
structure and board of directors’ composition. Minick and Noga (2010) consider 
Corporate Governance mechanisms as explanatory variables of ETRs. They emphasize 
that staggered boards are associated with higher effective tax rates. Following their 
approach we include in our regressions the influence of board of directors’ composition 
and ownership structure. The main reason to consider those Corporate Governance 
characteristics is related to the agency problem. Decisions regarding tax management 
with the objective of reducing effective tax rates have impact on firms’ performance and, 
hence, contribute to maximize firm value which will benefit shareholders. Nevertheless, 
these decisions are to some extent dependent on managers’ discretion. Therefore 
managers may not act in the best shareholders’ interests which give potential to the 
presence of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ownership structure, mainly, 
managerial ownership, is an important instrument to reduce that conflict. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest a positive association between managerial ownership and 
Corporate Governance. Florackis (2008) argues that an adequate level of managerial 
ownership reduces managers’ incentives for perk consumption and engagement in non-
maximizing activities. On the other hand, if there is a high level of managerial ownership, 
managers have more opportunities to extract own benefits and to intensify the 
entrenchment effect. As pointed out by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) the alignment of 
shareholders and managers interests through promotion of tax avoidance activities might 
not be that valuable to shareholders as expected. Due to the difficulty of measuring the 
actual effects of tax avoidance activities, these activities can smokescreen managers’ rent 
extraction behaviour. Therefore, shareholders’ willingness to promote tax avoidance 
activities is weakened by that fact. The existence of controlling shareholders, due to a 
high stake of shares held, may also influence shareholders’ willingness to monitor 
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managers’ decisions. Shareholders with higher participations will benefit more from 
higher earnings; therefore they have incentives to promote activities that contribute to the 
reduction of the effective tax rate (Florackis, 2008). On the other side, shareholders with 
a higher participation will be more exposed to potential penalties and reputational 
damages that may occur as a consequence of activities aiming the reduction of ETRs 
(Chen et al., 2010).    
When we talk about the duality managers – shareholders we must include a third 
party in this relationship. The board of directors is an important element to characterize 
firms’ Corporate Governance. It should develop a policy based governance system and a 
guidelines’ framework to conduct management actions. As a result, one of its 
responsibilities is monitoring managers (Adams et al., 2010). Additionally, the board of 
directors also chooses its own composition and officers. These functions can contribute 
to support and promote shareholders rights and interests, on the one hand, or to facilitate 
managerial opportunism depending upon the level of managers’ power, on the other hand. 
As a result, we must also consider the size and composition of board of directors as 
valuable characteristics to help to mitigate the agency problem.    
In order to investigate the determinants of effective tax rates described above, 
more specifically firms’ financial and operational characteristics and Corporate 
Governance attributes, we select a sample of non-financial firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Our sample is constituted by 704 firms which we analyse over the period 
2010-2013. With the purpose of studying the determinants of effective tax rates we 
estimate four regressions. The first two equations follow the model used by Richardson 
and Lanis (2007) and Kraft (2014); the last two equations introduce Corporate 
Governance mechanisms as in the Minick and Noga (2010) model. With the inclusion of 
Corporate Governance attributes we obtain a more complete model in order to test what 
affects effective tax rates. To estimate our regressions we use Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) cross-section weights with time fixed effects through the inclusion of year dummy 
variables.  
Our results show that firms’ specific characteristics have influence on ETRs. 
Larger and more profitable firms have higher ETRs. Unlike size and profitability, there 
is a negative relation between leverage, capital intensity, research and development 
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expenses and effective tax rates. These findings are consistent with those in previous 
researches. Concerning Corporate Governance mechanisms, we find evidence supporting 
the influence of ownership concentration and board of directors’ composition on ETRs. 
Insider ownership is associated with lower effective tax rates. On the contrary, firms with 
a less concentrated ownership structure evidence higher ETRs. Regarding board of 
directors’ composition, boards with a higher dimension have higher effective tax rates. 
As well, the presence of non-executive directors contributes to higher effective tax rates. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on effective tax rates both at the 
theoretical and the empirical level. Our first contribution to this field of investigation 
regards the sample we use. To our knowledge, the literature related to the study of 
effective tax rates which uses firms listed on the London Stock Exchange is scarce. The 
majority of the studies about Corporate Governance and ETRs are largely based on USA 
firms. Secondly, by considering firms listed on LSE and by analysing a more recent 
period than other studies, we observe how and which financial and operational indicators, 
can impact ETRs. These determinants are also a consequence of managers’ decisions. By 
taking this into consideration, our paper contributes to the extant literature on the 
influence of firms’ specific characteristics on ETRs. A third contribution results from the 
introduction of Corporate Governance mechanisms in the explanation of effective tax 
rates. There is a growing body of literature concerned about the influence of Corporate 
Governance on ETRs. This is mainly a consequence of agency problems and its impacts 
on firms’ performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may not act in the best 
interest of shareholders and, consequently, they can make decisions which are not value 
maximizing. Therefore, we must introduce in our analysis Corporate Governance 
attributes as these mechanisms help to control and monitor managers’ actions. To the best 
of our knowledge, our Corporate Governance set of variables is unique. We include in 
our model two different dimensions related to Corporate Governance attributes, we 
include variables to measure ownership structure and the board of directors’ composition. 
We use a set of four variables to test the influence of Corporate Governance on ETRs. A 
fourth contribution of our investigation is related to the measurement of our Corporate 
Governance variables. Our variables are measured year by year. The accuracy about the 
measurement of these variables constitutes another important contribution of our study as 
the majority of other studies using Corporate Governance usually consider these variables 
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as constant over short periods of time. To achieve this precision we needed to contact the 
provider of Amadeus Database as information of Corporate Governance for past years is 
not displayed on the information available to end users. Still concerning the variables of 
Corporate Governance, we add a fifth contribution as we use a variable to control firms’ 
independence in relation to blocking shareholders by considering participations higher 
than 25%. According to our knowledge, the most common variables related to ownership 
concentration define lower limits of participation to categorize firms as independent or 
not. In light of the above, we contribute to the previous literature by simultaneously 
observing the impact of firms’ characteristics and Corporate Governance mechanisms on 
ETR.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
review of the extant literature related with the influence of firms’ financial characteristics 
and Corporate Governance attributes on effective tax rates. In this section we develop our 
set of hypothesis. Section 3 describes the variables and the sample selection process. The 
methodology used in this paper and univariate results are evidenced on Section 4. Results 
regarding our hypotheses are exhibited on Section 5. To conclude, Section 6, presents a 
summary of this paper.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 Corporate taxation has becoming increasingly relevant to corporate financial 
decisions. Graham (2003) presents a set of corporate decisions that are influenced by 
taxes. As taxation represents a cost to a firm it necessarily affects its performance. 
Therefore, there has been a growing concern to find ways to reduce the firms’ tax burden. 
Hence, a large body of literature has been developed to investigate effective tax rates 
(Dyreng et al., 2008; Minick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012; Vieira, 2013; Kraft, 
2014). When we look at corporate taxation, nominal tax rates say very little about firms’ 
tax expense. In fact, a firm’s tax expense is obtained by applying a series of deferrals and 
accruals to the amount resulting from the multiplication of statutory tax rate and the pre-
tax income. This is caused by dissimilarities between accounting and fiscal systems which 
have different rules about the treatment of some items of financial statements. Such 
differences can be used by managers to reduce ETRs trough a legal way. The objective 
of minimize tax expense has been labelled with diverse terms by previous researchers, 
for example, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Dyreng et al. (2008) named it as tax 
avoidance and define it as anything that explicitly reduces taxes. Armstrong et al. (2012) 
and Wahab and Holland (2012) use the term tax planning, instead. Additionally, Minick 
and Noga (2010) alternatively termed it as tax management and clarify that it consists on 
“the ability to pay a low amount of taxes”. The possibility to manage taxes is to some 
extent related with the deferred component of tax expense. However, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) explain that strategies based on the deferred component of tax expense 
don’t have influence on the GAAP ETR. Nonetheless, it is still important to note that due 
to the time value of money, firms may choose to pay a low amount of taxes at the present 
moment and defer the payment of the remaining taxes to the future. By applying this 
strategy, firms are exploring the opportunities to manage deferred taxes.  
2.1 Firms’ financial and operational specific characteristics  
 Effective tax rates are determined by multiple major firms’ characteristics. Firms’ 
size is one of the characteristics expected to influence ETRs. This indicator is largely 
studied in the literature and almost all the investigations about effective tax rates include 
it as an indicator with a prediction power over ETRs. However, the direction of the 
relationship between firms’ size and ETRs can be ambiguous. Zimmerman (1983) 
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documents that larger firms are associated to higher effective tax rates. This can be 
explained by the political cost theory. According to this theory, effective tax rates are a 
proxy for political cost for the reason that taxes paid are a mean of wealth transfer from 
firms to other social groups. Effective tax rates are also a proxy for firms’ success, 
therefore, if larger firms are more successful than smaller firms those will be exposed to 
more political scrutiny. As larger firms are subject to higher scrutiny from tax authorities 
they have reluctance to reduce effective tax rates. Consequently, larger firms are expected 
to have a higher taxation burden when compared with firms which have a smaller 
dimension since taxes paid represent political costs which shall be borne by firms. 
Another competing theory argues that since larger firms have more power and more 
resources to manage taxes it is expected that they have lower ETRs (Siegfried, 1972). 
Consistent with this perspective, Dyreng et al. (2008) and Richardson and Lanis, (2007) 
find a negative relation between size and ETR. However, other studies report that firms’ 
size has a positive impact on effective tax rates (Rego, 2003; Vieira, 2013; Kraft, 2014). 
These studies confirm the political cost theory of Zimmerman (1983). In addition, Gupta 
and Newberry (1997) show that firms’ size and ETR are not associated when we look to 
this relationship over time. They studied that association with the inclusion of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. When analysing UK firms, Holland (1998) also finds mixed 
relations between size and ETR depending on the firms’ industry classification. Hence, 
previous literature has not reached a consensual opinion about the association between 
size and effective tax rates. Therefore, we expect that firms’ size influences ETRs but we 
do not predict the direction of this relation.  
H1a: ETRs are associated with firm size. 
 The analysis of capital structure is also fundamental to investigate which factors 
can influence firms’ effective tax rate. How a company chooses its financing resources is 
important due to different fiscal treatment of different means of funding. A firm may 
essentially decide between debt financing and equity financing. If a firm decides on equity 
financing, although it can be a cheaper alternative, it has a con associated since the 
remuneration of investors, i.e., dividends, are not deductible for tax purposes. The 
deductibility of interest expense leads firms to prefer debt financing rather than equity 
financing. As pointed out by Kraft (2014), firms’ financing decisions may also contribute 
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to the alignment of shareholders and managers’ interests. Managers of firms with higher 
levels of leverage are subject to the discipline of financing agreements imposed by 
creditors through the inclusion of limiting clauses. These restrictions reduce the leeway 
available to take decisions that are not value maximizing only for the purpose of 
extracting private benefits. Given this explanation, it is expected that more leveraged 
firms exhibit lower effective tax rates. Richardson and Lanis (2007) and Kraft (2014) find 
a significant negative relationship between leverage, used as a proxy for capital structure, 
and effective tax rates. Due to this advantage associated to the debt tax shield, our 
prediction is in line with the extant literature and, hence, we expect a negative association 
between debt financing and ETRs. This expectation is expressed by the following 
hypothesis: 
H1b: Higher leveraged firms have lower ETRs. 
 Along with firms’ financing decisions, investment decisions are also a 
characteristic that can influence effective tax rates. As pointed out by Hanlon et al. (2010), 
managers’ investment decisions can be to some extent constrained by corporate taxes due 
to the uncertainty of tax payments and deductions that have to be incorporated in the 
calculation of an investment’s present value. As well as the deductibility of interest 
expense, depreciations and amortizations are an important slice of firms’ costs. Therefore, 
firms that are more capital intensive benefit more from depreciations deductibility. This 
is even more important since an asset economic life is usually longer than the depreciation 
period (Richardson and Lanis, 2007). Due to the existence of different depreciation 
methods, more capital-intensive firms can easier manage taxes by accelerating or 
deferring depreciation expense and, consequently, they can take advantage from 
temporary book differences. Research and development (R&D) expenses are another 
aspect related to firms’ investment decisions which contribute to lower effective tax rates. 
There are many fiscal incentives through multiple jurisdictions that promote the 
investment in R&D. Research and development programs are conditional on tax rates and 
credit incentives (Hanlon et al. 2010). Accordingly to Richardson and Lanis (2007) 
capital intensity and R&D expenses are supposed to have a negative impact on ETRs. 
Moreover, these authors also control for the influence of inventory intensity on effective 
tax rates. However, by contrast with capital intensity and R&D expenditure, they argue 
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that firms with higher inventory intensity exhibit higher ETR. The consideration of capital 
intensity, R&D expense and inventory intensity as determinants of ETRs is not 
consensual among researchers. Regarding these asset mix variables, Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) document that both capital intensity and R&D expense have a negative and 
significant impact on ETR. With reference to the inventory intensity the same authors 
find a positive relation between a higher proportion of stocks and ETRs. They refer that 
the negative relation between inventory intensity and ETRs can be due to the substitution 
effect between inventory investment and capital investment. The results presented by 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) are in the same direction of the ones showed by Gupta and 
Newberry (1997). In reference to inventory intensity, Derashid and Zhang (2003) do not 
find a significant influence on ETRs but, in contrast, also show a negative association 
between capital intensity and ETRs. Recently, Rodríguez and Arias (2014) that study the 
determinants of ETR in the BRIC countries also document a positive association between 
inventory intensity and ETR. In contrast to these investigations, Kraft (2014) does not 
include asset mix variables as explanatory variables of effective tax rates. For instance, 
this author argues that the fiscal benefits associated to capital intensity which result in 
differences between book and tax accounts will be captured by the deferred component 
of effective tax rate. Therefore, capital intensity will not affect ETR. In opposition to 
Kraft (2014), we will consider the influence of asset mix variables as firms’ 
characteristics with potential to impact and determine ETRs. As a result we formulate the 
three following hypotheses: 
H1c: Capital intensity has a negative impact on ETRs. 
H1d: Inventory intensity has a positive impact on ETRs. 
H1e: R&D has a negative impact on ETRs. 
 An intuitive indicator with capacity to influence effective tax rate is firms’ 
profitability. Specifically, when we measure profitability based on pre-tax income it is 
expected that more profitable firms have higher earnings and, consequently, pay more 
taxes. This point of view is the one most evident in the literature. A positive association 
between firms profitability and ETR was found by Gupta and Newberry (1997), 
Richardson and Lanis (2007), Minick and Noga (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012). By 
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contrast, we can find authors who argue that profitable firms can benefit from tax 
exemptions and use tax deductions and tax credits in a more efficient manner and, as a 
result, these firms exhibit greater book-tax differences (Manzon and Plesko, 2002). As 
pointed out by Rego (2003) more profitable firms have lower costs associated to 
managing taxes because they have more resources to invest in tax planning activities that 
contribute to lower effective tax rates. Furthermore, firms with higher pre-tax income 
have more incentives to reduce their taxation burden and, consequently, to decrease 
ETRs. In accordance with the perspective of more profitable firms exhibit lower ETR, 
Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Kraft (2014) document a negative influence of firms’ 
profitability on ETRs. In view of these conflicting perspectives described above, we do 
not predict the expected sign to the relation between firms’ profitability and ETRs.  
H1f: Firms’ profitability is associated with ETRs. 
2.2 The influence of Corporate Governance 
 Some of the financial and operational indicators described above are a 
consequence of managers’ decisions. The main purpose of managers’ actions and choices 
should be maximizing firm value by constantly seeking value maximizing projects and 
efficient operational processes. Financial and investment decisions are to some extent the 
result of management discretion, consequently, firms may face agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These decisions have 
influence on the determinants of firms’ financial and operational characteristics, 
therefore, the relation between those characteristics and effective tax rates are somewhat 
the result of managers’ decision power. As effective tax rate is also a key factor of firms 
performance, managers also have to pay attention to this variable and include it in their 
decisions. Attempts to lower ETR are valuable to shareholders because it increases the 
result available to shareholders’ remuneration. However, managers may manage taxes 
not with the intention of lower effective tax rates. As pointed out by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006), managing taxes may be costly to shareholders because managers can 
disguise the pursuing of self-interest activities through the objective of lowering taxes. 
Despite our main focus isn’t tax avoidance activities, it is intuitive that when we talk 
about effective tax rate the objective is its reduction. Therefore, along with financial and 
operational determinants of ETRs, Corporate Governance mechanisms must be included 
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in the regressions of firms’ ETR. There is a large body of literature that studies the 
influence of Corporate Governance on effective tax rates (Chen et al., 2010; Minick and 
Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012; Wahab and Holland, 2012; Badertscher et al., 2013; 
Vieira, 2013).  
 The separation of ownership and control is one of the main reasons to the existence 
of agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As referred above managers may not 
be interested in lowering effective tax rates in order to increase shareholders’ wealth for 
the reason that this does not directly affect their own wealth. One governance mechanism 
that incentives the alignment of managers’ interests with those of shareholders and, 
therefore, helps to reduce agency problems is managerial ownership. As pointed out by 
Florackis (2008), this alignment effect is achieved through the minimization of managers’ 
incentives to perk consumption or pursuing of projects with negative returns. Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) state that as the cost of managers actions will also be borne by them, this 
may constrain their willingness to allocate resources to non-value maximizing activities. 
If managers hold a significant proportion of shares, reducing ETR will also benefit them 
and, consequently, they have incentives to make financial decisions that contribute to the 
reduction of effective tax rates. By contrast to this perspective, Badertscher et al. (2013) 
argue that management-owned firms have fewer incentives to manage taxes by reducing 
them because managers-owners are averse to invest in risky activities. In our study we 
are just concerned about tax management activities that take advantage of different 
accounting and fiscal rules and not activities that can be considered as tax evasion or 
illegal. As a result, in our investigation we do not consider actions to reduce ETR as being 
risky, therefore, we do not follow the perspective of Badertscher et al. (2013). Although 
managerial ownership contributes to align incentives, there is an opposite theory about 
the effect of managerial ownership on value maximizing activities. Researchers who have 
studied this topic also refer that after a certain level of managerial ownership, managers 
have enough power to act according their own interests (Fraile and Fradejas, 2014). In 
the presence of higher managerial ownership, non-managers shareholders may have 
difficulties in monitoring managers’ behaviour because managers can exert more control 
and won’t care about the monitor and pressure exerted by outside shareholders (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004). Therefore, high levels of managerial ownership contribute to the 
entrenchment effect and reduce the threat of removal caused by inefficient management. 
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By studying the relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs, Florackis 
(2008) finds that after a ten percent level of managerial ownership there is a positive 
impact on agency costs that corroborate the entrenchment effect. Huang et al. (2010) also 
find that shareholder monitoring will be effective only if managerial ownership won’t be 
too much high to induce the entrenchment effect.  
The analysis of ownership structure as part of Corporate Governance mechanisms 
should also take into account ownership concentration. Concentrated ownership is also 
an alternative way to reduce agency problems. According to Florackis (2008), 
shareholders with small participations have little incentives to monitor management, but 
if they own a significant stake of shares they will have interest in actively and effectively 
monitor management. Shareholders bear all the costs related to monitoring activities, 
therefore, just a large proportion of ownership will justify that they actively monitor 
management. By this way, managerial discretion is refrained and, thus, helps to mitigate 
agency problems between shareholders and managers (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
However, the reduction of agency problems through ownership concentration can be 
compromised due to another agency conflict. Firms with shareholders holding a large 
stake of shares may face agency problems between large and minority shareholders. This 
is particularly relevant because large shareholders have enough power to engage in 
activities which allow them to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Controlling shareholders would have more 
incentives to induce managers to reduce effective tax rates since their benefits resulting 
from more elevated earnings would also be higher. Chen et al. (2010) observe the 
relationship between tax aggressiveness and ownership structure by analysing the 
behaviour of family owned firms. On the one hand, concentrated family owners benefit 
from tax management activities due to tax savings; on the other hand, tax aggressiveness 
has costs associated like penalties, price discounts imposed by minority shareholders and 
the loss of reputational capital. For these reasons they find family firms, with higher 
ownership concentration, to be less aggressive than non-family firms. In addition to the 
potential of managerial ownership to reduce agency problems depending on the level of 
insider ownership (alignment effect versus entrenchment effect), ownership 
concentration may also exert a positive influence. As pointed by Fraile and Fradejas 
(2014), ownership concentration can influence the shareholders’ willingness to actively 
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monitor managers’ behaviour. In light of the above, we can find two competing theories. 
Ownership concentration can contribute to value maximizing activities and to reduce 
agency problem, or to accentuate agency conflicts between large shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Considering the above theories we expect ownership structure to 
be associated with effective tax rates either through insider ownership or ownership 
concentration but since there is not a consensus in literature we do no predict the sign of 
the relation. As a result, we present the following hypothesis: 
H2: Ownership structure is associated with ETRs. 
Another important Corporate Governance mechanism that influences the 
relationship between managers and shareholders is the board of directors. Adams et al. 
(2010) refer that directors are agents of shareholders. In consequence, the board of 
directors should incentive actions that contribute to the ultimate objective of any firm: 
create value to shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) characterize the board of directors 
as a decision system. They argue that the board of directors has important powers such as 
to hire, fire and compensate managers and also the power to ratify and monitor important 
decisions. We expect good Corporate Governance mechanisms to have a positive impact 
on the reduction of effective tax rates through the reduction of agency conflicts. 
Therefore, if the board of directors is regarded as a mechanism to diminish those conflicts 
as a result of its monitoring role, we also have to include the board of directors in the 
relation between Corporate Governance and effective tax rates. The most studied board 
of directors’ characteristics as important Corporate Governance mechanisms are its size 
and composition. According to prior research, board size can be positively or negatively 
associated to Corporate Governance effectiveness (Wahab and Holland, 2012). The 
positive effect of board size results from the fact that larger boards benefit more from the 
diversity of its directors. Larger boards of directors can take advantage of the skills, 
expertise and experience of its members. This variety of skills contributes to a better 
advice about strategic decisions since larger boards can have a broader perspective about 
economic environment and can easier identify business opportunities (Pearce and Zahara, 
1991). Other researchers document the negative consequences of a larger board of 
directors. Eisenberg et al. (1998) highlight the problems that arise from increase board 
dimension. Communication and coordination problems accentuate as the number of board 
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members increases. Additionally, larger boards have a reduced ability to control 
management. In the presence of larger boards it is also more difficult to achieve consensus 
about decisions which can difficult the implementation of important investment 
opportunities. Yermack (1996) analyses the relation between board size and firm value. 
He finds that firms with smaller boards have higher value.  
Although it is important to consider the number of directors as a measure of 
Corporate Governance, it is no less relevant to observe the board composition. An 
important characteristic of the board of directors’ composition is the classification of 
directors as non-executive (outside) or executive (inside) directors. As stated by Florackis 
(2008) board of directors with a higher proportion of non-executive directors are more 
effective monitors of management team. In fact, he emphasizes that turnover of inefficient 
management increases as the proportion of non-executive directors increases. Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) also argue that outside directors are appointed with the purpose of acting 
in the best shareholders’ interest. Therefore, they expect that a higher proportion of non-
executive directors contribute to improve the decision making process by the board of 
directors and to defend the shareholders’ interest as non-executive directors must be 
impartial. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that outside directors can act as mediators of 
internal managers’ disagreements; outside directors can control corporate top managers’ 
competition. By this way, they help to reduce agency problems. The same authors also 
assert that as non-executive directors compensation is not influenced by company 
performance they have more incentives to effectively monitor management. Particularly, 
the good performance of non-executive directors should be rewarded by the market. An 
opposite argument claim that non-executive directors are less informed about the firm 
and prefer avoid confronts instead of actively monitor managers (Florackis, 2008). Hence, 
insider directors are regarded as important members of board of directors because they 
have valuable information about the corporation. However, management dominated 
boards will easily ignore shareholders’ interests due the difficulty to limit the discretion 
of individual managers to pursue their own interests (Lanis and Richardson, 2011). 
Therefore, there is propensity to argue that non-executive directors are more effective to 
mitigate agency problems due to their independence, professional knowledge and 
experience (Wahab and Holland, 2012). However, this is not consensual. As result of the 
previously explained, we expect that board of directors have enough power to exert 
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influence on effective tax rate since it is expected that they help to reduce agency conflicts 
and, hence, preserve shareholders’ interests. Due to the pros and cons associated to board 
size we do not make a prediction about the influence of this variable on ETRs. However, 
with respect to board composition, we expect that more independent boards contribute to 
monitor managers and, consequently, contribute to lower ETRs due to a more efficient 
management of tax burden. Hence, we formulate two additional hypotheses: 
H3a: Board size is associated with ETRs. 
H3b: A large proportion of non-executive directors is associated with lower ETRs. 
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3. Variables Definition and Sample Selection 
3.1. Variables Definition 
3.1.1. Tax Variables 
We are interested in studying the determinants of effective tax rates as well as the 
influence of Corporate Governance variables on ETRs. Consequently, effective tax rate 
is our dependent variable. Due to differences between financial balance sheet and tax 
balance sheet, tax expense is not composed only by current tax expense but also by 
deferred tax expense. As expressed in IAS 12.5 (IASB, 2010) “tax expense (tax income) 
is the aggregate amount included in the determination of profit or loss for the period in 
respect of current tax and deferred tax”. The latter component accounts for all differences 
in the calculation of financial and taxable profit which may result from temporary 
differences and/or the use of tax losses or tax credits. Many authors have considered 
different ETR measures in their studies. Regarding the numerator of the ratio used to 
compute the effective tax rate, Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Rego (2003) are some of 
the authors that use only current tax expense in the numerator. However, we believe that 
the inclusion of deferred tax expense in the numerator will produce more accurate results 
as deferred expense also reflects the influence of firms’ specific characteristics on their 
tax burden. Therefore, our study is in line with Richardson and Lanis (2007), Chen et al. 
(2010), Minick and Noga (2010), Armstrong et al. (2012) and Kraft (2014), for instance. 
Similar to the numerator, the choice of the ratio’s denominator is not objective. As pointed 
out by previous researchers (Gupta and Newberry, 1997 and Richardson and Lanis, 2007) 
we can select taxable income, financial income or cash flow from operations as 
denominator. Nevertheless, as mentioned by the same authors, taxable income is not a 
good measure because if both the numerator and the denominator are calculated after tax 
adjustments, we wouldn’t be able to observe the impact of tax preferences on effective 
tax rates. Consequently, we will compute our effective tax rate considering both pre-tax 
income and cash flow from operations as denominators. Our cash flow from operations 
measure is defined as the sum of profit for the period and depreciation and amortization 
expense. We also use cash flow from operations in the denominator because this variable 
reflects important tax preferences related with firms’ size and asset mix which can lead 
to tax reduction. In fact, as Zimmerman (1983) states, when we use cash flow from 
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operations in the denominator we can control for differences which may result from 
different accounting methods. In light of the above our effective tax rate measures are as 
follows: 
ܧܴܶͳ =  ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܶܽݔ ܧݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁��ܲݎ݁ − ܶܽݔ �݊ܿ݋݉݁��  
 
ܧܴܶʹ =  ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܶܽݔ ܧݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁��ܥܽݏℎ ܨ݈݋ݓ ݂ݎ݋݉ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ�݋݊ݏ�� 
 
where i denotes the firm and t denotes the year. In order to control for any potential bias 
in our study and following Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Kraft (2014), we applied 
some restrictions to our ETRs values. We restricted our ETRs to lie between 0% and 
100%. If total tax expense is negative we defined ETR as 0%. This restriction takes in 
consideration the possibility of tax refunds. On the other hand, if pre-tax income or cash 
flow from operations is negative and the total tax expense is positive, we set ETR1 or 
ETR2 to 100%, respectively. More recent studies consider long-run effective tax rate 
measures (Dyreng et al., 2008; Minick and Noga, 2010; Vieira, 2013). Dyreng et al. 
(2008) introduce the long-run ETR in order to study corporate tax avoidance arguing that 
annual ETR has some limitations. They claim that the main limitation of annual ETR is 
its year-to-year variability. Notwithstanding this limitation, due to our sample period we 
will build our study based on a one-year measure. Moreover, our focus is mainly to 
understand which firms’ specific financial and operational characteristics and Corporate 
Governance attributes can impact ETR. As our primarily concern is not investigate tax 
avoidance activities that results in lower ETR, we believe that annual effective tax rate 
also attends our main purpose.  
3.1.2. Independent Variables 
3.1.2.1. Firms’ specific variables 
 To examine the financial and operational determinants of effective tax rates we 
concentrate our analysis mostly in four hypotheses related to firms’ size, leverage, asset 
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structure and profitability. To account for firms dimension we use the variable SIZE 
which is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets. This variable is largely used in 
papers related to the study of effective tax rates (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Richardson 
and Lanis, 2007; Minick and Noga, 2010; Vieira, 2013). To evaluate the influence of debt 
tax shield on ETRs we use the variable LEV which is the ratio between long term debt 
and shareholders’ equity. Chen et al. (2010), Huang et al. (2010) and Armstrong et al. 
(2012) are some of the authors that include a proxy for leverage in their researches. 
Regarding assets structure we describe three different hypotheses related with three 
different ratios. We start by interpreting the influence of capital intensity on ETRs 
resulting from depreciation and amortization expense; therefore, we define the variable 
CAP_INT as the ratio between net property, plant and equipment and total assets. In 
opposition to firms’ capital intensity, we include the variable INV_INT as an explanatory 
variable of ETRs. This variable is expected to have a substitution effect with capital 
intensity. Our inventory intensity variable is defined as the ratio of total inventories to 
total assets. To take into consideration the effect of the investment tax shield associated 
to R&D expenses, we use the variable R&D_INT. It is defined as R&D expense divided 
by total sales. These asset mix variables are frequently used in literature (Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Derashid, and Zhang, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Minick and 
Noga, 2010; Rodríguez and Arias, 2014). Firms’ profitability is commonly used as a 
variable with explanatory power of ETRs. For this reason, we also include in our study 
the variable ROA which is defined as the ratio between pre-tax income and total assets. 
Return on Assets is used in studies related to ETR such as Armstrong et al. (2012), Vieira 
(2013) and Kraft (2014).  
 In addition to the above variables related to firms’ financial and operational 
characteristics, many studies have used market-to-book ratio as a firm-specific 
characteristic that may have an explanatory power on effective tax rates (Chen et al., 
2010; Armstrong et al., 2012; Kraft, 2014). Through the inclusion of this variable we 
control for firms’ growth potential. We define MB as market capitalization divided by 
shareholders’ funds. As Minick and Noga (2010) and Vieira (2013) we also include 
D_EARN which is a dummy variable equals to one if a firm has positive earnings and 
equals to zero if not. As explained by those authors we need to control for negative 
earnings as they may bias our analysis. 
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3.1.2.2. Corporate Governance Variables 
Another set of hypotheses is developed in light of the influence of Corporate 
Governance mechanisms on effective tax rates. Corporate Governance characteristics can 
also influence firms’ financial decisions and, as a result, may have impact on ETRs. In 
order to take into account Corporate Governance aspects, we analyse ownership structure 
and board of directors’ composition. The first variable used is INS_OWN which is 
measured as the ratio between closely held shares and common shares outstanding. 
According to Datastream database, the variable closely held shares represents the number 
of “shares held by insiders. It includes officers, directors and their immediate families, 
shares held in trust, shares of the company held by any other corporation (except shares 
held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions), shares held by 
pension/benefit plans and shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares”. This variable is also used by Huang et al. (2010) and Vieira (2013). 
However, other authors have used institutional ownership instead of insider ownership 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009 and Wahab and Holland, 2012). Following Florackis 
(2008), in conjunction with the variable for insider ownership, we also include the 
variable OWN_CONC which is a dummy variable equals to one if no shareholder holds 
more than 25% of outstanding shares and equals to zero, otherwise. We compute 
ownership concentration based on the Independence Indicator of Amadeus Database 
which attributes a classification of A, B, C, D or U to companies according to the degree 
of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders.1 The limit of 25% of 
shareholders’ participations is more ambitious than the ones frequently used in literature. 
Other important dimension we must consider when studying the influence of Corporate 
Governance mechanisms relates to board of directors’ composition. We start with the 
inclusion of the variable BOARD which designates the total number of current board 
members. The dimension of board of directors is a variable extensively used in literature 
(Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Minick and Noga, 2010; Lanis and Richardson, 
2011; Wahab and Holland, 2012). Alongside with board of directors’ dimension we also 
analyse its composition. We expect that board independence can influence ETRs. 
Therefore, we include in our analysis the number of non-executive board members to 
                                                          
1
 The Independence Indicator of Amadeus database is defined with more detail in the Appendix. 
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capture that effect. The variable used is NON_EXEC which represents the ratio of total 
number of non-executive directors to total number of directors. The distinction between 
insiders and outsiders directors is also made by Florackis (2008), Lanis and Richardson 
(2011) and Wahab and Holland (2012). All our Corporate Governance variables are 
measured year by year. Despite most of studies consider these variables constant during 
more than one year, we computed all variables year by year in order to obtain more precise 
and rigorous estimations. As the information available to compute these variables 
displayed on the database relates to the current year, to obtain year values for the variables 
OWN_CONC, BOARD and NON_EXEC we needed to contact the provider of Amadeus 
Database. Otherwise, we would not be able to obtain the values for these variables year 
by year as they are not available to database end users.   
3.2. Sample Selection 
 Table 1 describes our sample selection process. Our investigation is based on the 
analysis of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period between 2010 
and 2013. We start the construction of our sample by considering all LSE listed firms 
with data available on Amadeus Database. This selection results in a sample of 1531 
firms. Except for the variable insider ownership, all our remaining variables are from 
Amadeus Database. We obtain insider ownership by collecting the number of closely held 
shares and total common shares outstanding from DataStream Database. Due to the use 
of two different databases we need to assure that the firms obtained from one database 
match exactly the firms obtained from the other. In order to guarantee that the firms of 
Amadeus Database and the firms of DataStream Database are exactly the same we make 
the match between both databases by using the International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN number) which is unique for each firm. Through the use of this code we 
assure that there is no inconsistency in our sample and that the use of two databases has 
no impact on the accuracy and rigor of our results. Through this matching procedure 
between Amadeus Database’ variables and DataStream Database’ variable the sample is 
reduced to 1195 firms. After this process we also exclude 4 firms that are in “insolvency 
process” or “dormant” status, therefore we just keep firms with an “active” status. 
Additionally, we constrain our sample by excluding all firms with unavailable 
information about our two measures of effective tax rates. The total number of firms 
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which meet our sample selection criteria is 745. Regarding industry classification, we 
categorize the firms of our sample according to the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry 
classifications. We exclude all firms that fall into the following five classifications: 
“Banks” (5 firms), “Insurance” (2 firms) and “Trading” (34 firms). After all exclusions, 
our final sample contains 704 firms for 4 years which represents 2816 firm year 
observations.  
Table 2 summarizes all variables used in our study, how they are computed, their 
sources and the expected sign of their estimated coefficients.  
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Table 1: Sample selection process 
Details Number of firms 
Listed firms on the London Stock Exchange from Amadeus 
Database 1531 
Match between Amadeus Database and DataStream Database (336) 
Firms with a non "Active" status (4) 
Firms with at least one year of ETRs information not available (446) 
Financial firms (41) 
Final sample 704 
Number of firm year observations 2816 
This table explains our sample construction process. 
 
Table 2: Variables, definition, databases and expected signs of estimated coefficients 
Variable Definition Database 
Predicted 
Sign 
Tax Variables  
ETR 1 Tax expense / Pre-tax income Amadeus  
ETR 2 Tax expense / Cash flow from operations Amadeus  
Firm Specific Variables  
SIZE Log (total assets) Amadeus +/- 
LEV Long-term debt / Shareholders equity Amadeus - 
CAP_ INT Net property, plant and equipment / Total assets Amadeus - 
INV_INT Total inventories / Total assets Amadeus + 
RD_INT R&D expense / Total sales Amadeus - 
ROA Pre-tax income / Total assets Amadeus +/- 
MB Market capitalization / Shareholders funds Amadeus  
D_EARN Equals to 1 if earnings > 0; 0 otherwise Amadeus  
Corporate Governance Variables  
INS_OWN Closely held shares / Common shares outstanding DataStream +/- 
OWN_CONC 
Equals to 1 if no shareholder holds more than 25% 
of outstanding shares; 0 otherwise 
Amadeus +/- 
BOARD Number of current directors Amadeus +/- 
NON_EXEC 
Number of non-executive directors / Number of 
directors 
Amadeus - 
This table summarizes all variables used in this paper, their definition, source and expected sign of 
estimated coefficients.  
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4. Methodology and Univariate Analysis 
4.1. Methodology 
 In order to test the hypotheses developed in section 2, in this section we explain 
the methodology used. 
 Our data set has a panel structure; therefore we apply a panel data model with the 
aim of achieving best estimation results. Baltagi (2003) points out some of the main 
advantages of using panel data models. In fact, panel data can control for individual 
heterogeneity and allow identifying and measuring effects that are not detectable using 
other data models. Also, it has the benefits of reducing the collinearity and allowing for 
more degrees of freedom while being more efficient. In this sense, through a panel data 
structure we can control for unobservable effects that are present in cross-section and time 
dimensions. With panel data the most commonly estimated models are fixed effects 
models and random effects models. Fixed effects models have the ability to control for 
omitted variables bias as long as these variables are time-invariant. Therefore, fixed 
effects models also control for the effect of time-invariant differences between the 
individuals. On the other hand, random effects models distinguish from fixed effects 
models because unobserved variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with observed 
variables. Consequently, the error term is not correlated with explanatory variables. 
With the purpose of determining whether random or fixed effects should be 
considered, we perform the Hausman test. The result allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients and, thus, the fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
We have also detected the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals. To test for 
heteroskedasticity we perform the White test. Taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the data used, we estimate our regressions using Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) cross-section weights with a fixed effect model for time through the 
inclusion of year dummy variables. Due to firm individual heterogeneity we can control 
for discrepant individual variance by using a GLS model and, as a result, we obtain more 
efficient coefficient estimations. We include year dummies to control for time effects due 
to unexpected variation or special events that could affect the dependent variable, through 
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this way the time effects included in the error term can be removed. In order to mitigate 
the effect of influential observations on results, each independent variable was winsorized 
at 1% and 99% levels.  
To test the first set of hypotheses regarding the firms’ specific characteristics that 
influence ETRs, we present two regressions models. These two models only differ in the 
tax variable used, ETR1 or ETR2. These models are our initial point of investigation. The 
first two regressions models are as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
                               
 
 
where i relates to each firm (i=1…N) and t relates to each year (2010-2013), the error 
term is represented by ���. As previously explained, ETR1 is computed as the ratio 
between tax expense and pre-tax income and ETR2 is calculated as tax expense scaled by 
operational cash flow. Apart from firms’ financial and operational specific determinants, 
we also include in the regression two control variables, MB and D_EAR. 
In a second phase, we test how Corporate Governance mechanisms can influence 
effective tax rates. Therefore, we include in our regressions Corporate Governance 
variables related to ownership structure and board composition. This second set of 
equations is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
ܧܴܶʹ�� = �଴ + �ଵ ܵ�ܼܧ�� + �ଶ ܮܧ �ܸ� + �ଷ ܥܣܲ_�ܰܶ�� + �ସ �ܸܰ_�ܰܶ�� + �ହ ܴܦ_�ܰܶ�� + 
                �଺ ܴܱܣ�� + �଻ ܯܤ�� + �଼ ܦ_ܧܣܴܰ�� + ܻ݁ܽݎ �݊݀�ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ +  ���  (4.2) 
ܧܴܶͳ�� = �଴ + �ଵ ܵ�ܼܧ�� + �ଶ ܮܧ �ܸ� + �ଷ ܥܣܲ_�ܰܶ�� + �ସ �ܸܰ_�ܰܶ�� + �ହ ܴܦ_�ܰܶ�� + 
                �଺ ܴܱܣ�� + �଻ ܯܤ�� + �଼ ܦ_ܧܣܴܰ�� + ܻ݁ܽݎ �݊݀�ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ +  ��� (4.1) 
ܧܴܶʹ�� =  �଴ +  �ଵ ܵ�ܼܧ�� + �ଶ ܮܧ �ܸ� +  �ଷ ܥܣܲ_�ܰܶ�� + �ସ �ܸܰ_�ܰܶ�� + �ହ ܴܦ_�ܰܶ�� + 
     �଺ ܴܱܣ��  + �଻ ܯܤ��  + �଼ ܦ_ܧܣܴܰ�� + �ଽ �ܰܵ_ܱܹܰ��  + �ଵ଴ ܱܹܰ_ܥܱܰܥ��  +  
       �ଵଵ ܤܱܣܴܦ�� + �ଵଶ ܱܰܰ_ܧܺܧܥ�� + ܻ݁ܽݎ �݊݀�ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ + ��� (4.4) 
ܧܴܶͳ�� =  �଴ +  �ଵ ܵ�ܼܧ�� + �ଶ ܮܧ �ܸ� +  �ଷ ܥܣܲ_�ܰܶ�� + �ସ �ܸܰ_�ܰܶ�� + �ହ ܴܦ_�ܰܶ�� + 
     �଺ ܴܱܣ��  + �଻ ܯܤ��  + �଼ ܦ_ܧܣܴܰ�� + �ଽ �ܰܵ_ܱܹܰ��  + �ଵ଴ ܱܹܰ_ܥܱܰܥ��  +  
       �ଵଵ ܤܱܣܴܦ�� + �ଵଶ ܱܰܰ_ܧܺܧܥ�� + ܻ݁ܽݎ �݊݀�ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ + ��� (4.3) 
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where i relates to each firm (i=1…N) and t relates to each year (2010-2013), the error 
term is represented by ���. Tax variables and firms’ specific variables are the same of the 
first two models. Additionally, we include in both regressions four new variables to test 
the impact of Corporate Governance on ETRs. 
4.2 Univariate Results 
Summary descriptive statistics for both dependent and explanatory variables for 
the period 2010-2013 are reported in Table 3. The aggregate average for ETR1 (ETR2) 
is 24.5% (19.8%) which represents almost one quarter of the pre-tax earnings of the firms. 
As our sample comprises firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, the mean value of 
ETR1 is in line with the value for statutory corporate tax rate in United Kingdom which 
decreased from 28%, in 2010, to 23%, in 2013. As expected, our sample consists mainly 
of large firms as total assets present an approximately mean (maximum) value of € 3,000 
million (€250,000 millions). Also, the majority of our sample consists of capital intensive 
firms with non-current assets representing more than 50% of total assets. Conversely, the 
proportion of inventories on total assets is reduced; its average is below 10%. Regarding 
the influence of R&D intensity, on average, it has a low value (6%). However, it was 
observed a maximum value of 78.9%, indicating a large disparity in terms of the use of 
R&D incentives. Market value is, on average, almost two and half times the book value 
evidencing higher market capitalization of our sample firms. Approximately, 77% of the 
reported earnings before taxes were positive during our sample period. As regards 
Corporate Governance variables and concerning the ownership structure, we can observe 
that about 29% of total outstanding shares of our sample’s firms are closely held. This 
value varies between 91% to firms with shares almost totally held by insiders, and 0% to 
firms with no insider participation. The dummy variable OWN_CONC has an average 
value of 67.4% which means that firms are mainly independent from controlling 
shareholders or that no shareholder holds more than 25% of firms’ shares. In relation to 
board of directors, our sample’s firms have on average a board of directors composed by 
12 directors. The board of directors dimension ranges from 4 to 37 directors. Non-
executive directors constitute almost 40% of the total board of directors’ members.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 summarizes univariate statistics for both tax variables and explanatory variables. ETR1 is computed 
as the ratio between total tax expense and pre-tax income. ETR2 is defined as the ratio between total tax 
expense and cash flow from operations. ASSETS is total assets in euros, LEV is long term debt divided by 
shareholders equity, CAP_INT is net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets, INV_INT is total 
inventories divided by total assets, RD_INT is R&D expense scaled by total sales, ROA is pre-tax income 
divided by total assets, MB is market capitalization divided by shareholders funds, D_EARN is a dummy 
variable set to one if earnings before taxes are positive and zero otherwise, INS_OWN is closely held shares 
scaled by common shares outstanding, OWN_CONC is a dummy variable equals to one if no shareholder 
holds more than 25% of total shares outstanding and zero otherwise, BOARD is the number of current 
directors and NON_EXEC is the number of non-executive directors divided by total number of directors. 
The sample comprises 704 firms for the period 2010-2013 which represents 2816 firm-year observations.  
Table 4 presents the distribution of the firms of our sample according to the 48 
Fama and French (1997) industry classification codes. It also presents average effective 
tax rates by industry for our sample period, 2010-2013. One quarter of our sample is 
constituted by firms which fall into the category of “Business Services” (178 firms). 
“Retail” and “Petroleum & Natural Gas” are the next largest categories, however, with a 
much smaller number of firms, 43 and 34, respectively. There are 8 categories which have 
an average ETR1 greater than 30%. The highest ETR1 is found in the category 
“Petroleum & Natural Gas” (43.5%). The category “Precious Metals” also has an ETR1 
above 40%.  These two latter categories also have the highest ETR2, 35.5% and 33.7%, 
respectively. On the opposite side, the lowest ETR1 belongs to “Medical equipment” 
category (11.9%). There are 5 more categories with an average ETR1 below 20%: 
“Utilities”, “Electrical Equipment”, “Toys & Recreation”, “Real Estate” and “Soda”. 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
ETR1 0.245 0.211 1 0 0.269 
ETR2 0.198 0.149 1 0 0.239 
ASSETS 3,021,243,110 132,916,581 256,689,165,202 348,832 16,073,591,238 
LEV 0.424 0.135 5.874 0 0.841 
CAP_INT 0.547 0.565 0.968 0.014 0.238 
INV_INT 0.094 0.035 0.732 0 0.133 
RD_INT 0.064 0.019 0.789 0 12.756 
ROA 0.031 0.055 0.312 -0.677 15.377 
MB 2.495 1.562 23.789 -11.74 3.940 
D_EARN 0.768 1 1 0 0.422 
INS_OWN 0.287 0.233 0.913 0 0.266 
OWN_CONC 0.674 1 1 0 0.469 
BOARD 11.7 10 37 4 6.365 
NON_EXEC 0.399 0.4 0.808 0 0.160 
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Table 4: Industry composition and average ETRs by industry 
Industry                                
(per Fama and French 1997) 
Number of 
firms 
% of total 
firms 
Average 
ETR1 
Average 
ETR2 
Agriculture 10 1.4% 0.239 0.215 
Food 8 1.1% 0.233 0.184 
Soda 4 0.6% 0.196 0.196 
Toys & Recreation 4 0.6% 0.160 0.094 
Fun & Entertainment 13 1.8% 0.376 0.154 
Printing & Publishing 14 2.0% 0.225 0.143 
Household Consumer goods 13 1.8% 0.215 0.189 
Medical Equipment 13 1.8% 0.119 0.099 
Pharmaceutical Products 18 2.6% 0.204 0.170 
Chemicals 14 2.0% 0.223 0.207 
Rubber & Plastic 7 1.0% 0.276 0.210 
Construction Materials 18 2.6% 0.231 0.223 
Construction 26 3.7% 0.236 0.243 
Steel Works 5 0.7% 0.218 0.176 
Machinery 17 2.4% 0.253 0.204 
Electrical Equipment 10 1.4% 0.151 0.127 
Aircraft 4 0.6% 0.202 0.138 
Precious Metal 14 2.0% 0.406 0.337 
Non-Metalling and Metal Mining 15 2.1% 0.342 0.305 
Coal 4 0.6% 0.336 0.249 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 34 4.8% 0.435 0.355 
Utilities 10 1.4% 0.140 0.110 
Telecom Comunications 18 2.6% 0.264 0.164 
Personal Services 6 0.9% 0.300 0.180 
Business Services 178 25.3% 0.213 0.180 
Computers 18 2.6% 0.330 0.206 
Electronic Equipment 30 4.3% 0.205 0.167 
Lab Equipment 8 1.1% 0.308 0.209 
Business Supplies 8 1.1% 0.294 0.201 
Transportation 20 2.8% 0.241 0.192 
Wholesale 24 3.4% 0.294 0.234 
Retail 43 6.1% 0.253 0.201 
Restaurants, Hotels 19 2.7% 0.235 0.161 
Real Estate 33 4.7% 0.180 0.188 
Other * 24 3.4% 0.201 0.153 
Table 4 categorizes our sample according to 48 Fama and French (1997) industry classification codes. 
*Other industries include those industries that represent 3 or less firms of total sample: Beer and Liquor, 
Tobacco Products, Apparel, Healthcare, Textiles, Fabricated products, Automobiles and Trucks, 
Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment, Shipping Containers and Other. ETR1 is computed as the ratio 
between total tax expense and pre-tax income. ETR2 is defined as the ratio between total tax expense and 
cash flow from operations.  
28 
 
Table 5 shows Pearson’s correlations between tax variables, ETR1 and ETR2, and 
all explanatory variables. As expected our tax variables are positively correlated for the 
reason that they only differ in their denominator. Regarding ETR1 we can observe a 
positive correlation between ETR1 and ASSETS consistent with a positive impact of firm 
size on effective tax rates, which supports the political cost theory. Also, ROA and MB 
are positively correlated with ETR1 implying that firms’ profitability and growth can 
contribute to higher effective tax rates. On the subject of R&D intensity, it exhibits a 
negative relationship with ETR1 evidencing the positive effect of R&D expenses’ 
deductibility on effective tax rates. In terms of the ownership structure, on the one hand, 
INS_OWN is inversely correlated to ETR1 evidencing the positive effect of managerial 
ownership on the reduction of ETRs. On the other hand, firms with a less concentrated 
ownership structure seem to have higher ETR1. As regards the dimension of board of 
directors it is documented that more board members have a positive influence on ETR1. 
Regarding Pearson’s correlations between ETR2 and all explanatory variables we can 
observe similar results to those observed to ETR1. Considering correlations between 
explanatory variables, we observe that capital intensity displays a positive correlation 
with total assets highlighting that larger firms tend to be also more capital intensive. 
CAP_INT and INV_INT are strongly negatively related corroborating the substitution 
effect between them. More leveraged firms are also more capital intensive firms. Larger 
and more profitable firms have larger board of directors. On the contrary, larger boards 
are negatively correlated with the percentage of closely held shares. Taking into 
consideration the stake of shares hold by insiders, we can verify that it has a negative 
relationship with firms’ independence from controlling shareholders. Bearing in mind the 
relatively low values of correlation’s coefficients we can assume that multicollinearity is 
not an issue in our sample.  
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Table 5: Pearson’s correlation matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
ETR1 (1) 1                           
ETR2 (2) 0.661 1             
ASSETS (3) 0.112 0.033 1            
LEV (4) 0.098 0.085 0.088 1           
CAP_INT (5) 0.045 -0.043 0.258 0.200 1          
INV_INT (6) 0.081 0.114 -0.113 0.002 -0.480 1         
RD_INT (7) -0.164 -0.160 -0.106 -0.160 -0.268 -0.163 1        
ROA (8) 0.111 0.203 0.077 -0.001 0.085 0.147 -0.392 1       
MB (9) 0.003 0.093 -0.038 0.443 -0.146 0.027 -0.016 0.079 1      
D_EARN (10) 0.004 0.096 0.046 0.044 0.061 0.113 -0.285 0.731 -0.008 1     
INS_OWN (11) -0.123 -0.100 -0.184 -0.158 -0.265 0.080 0.055 -0.144 -0.067 -0.112 1    
OWN_CONC (12) 0.049 0.079 -0.033 0.053 0.068 -0.004 -0.117 0.106 0.048 0.074 -0.323 1   
BOARD (13) 0.161 0.118 0.559 0.199 0.347 -0.067 -0.170 0.223 0.017 0.170 -0.378 0.054 1  
NON_EXEC (14) 0,059 0.041 -0.017 0.067 -0.016 -0.017 0.073 -0.017 0.093 -0.064 -0.025 -0.015 -0.236 1 
 
Table 5 presents the Pearson’s correlations for all variables used in this study. ETR1 is computed as the ratio between total tax expense and pre-tax income. ETR2 is 
defined as the ratio between total tax expense and cash flow from operations. ASSETS is the total assets in euros, LEV is long term debt divided by shareholders equity, 
CAP_INT is net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets, INV_INT is total inventories divided by total assets, RD_INT is R&D expense scaled by total sales, 
ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets, MB is market capitalization divided by shareholders funds, D_EARN is a dummy variable equals to one if earnings before 
taxes are positive and zero otherwise, INS_OWN is closely held shares scaled by common shares outstanding, OWN_CONC is a dummy variable equals to one if no 
shareholder holds more than 25% of total shares outstanding and zero otherwise, BOARD is the number of current directors and NON_EXEC is the number of non-
executive directors divided by total number of directors. The sample comprises 704 firms for the period between 2010 and 2013 which represents 2816 firm-year 
observations.
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5. Results 
5.1. Multivariate analysis 
5.1.1. Results for firms’ specific characteristics 
 In order to test which firms’ specific characteristics influence effective tax rates, 
we estimate equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-
section weights with year dummies to control for time effects. These two equations 
constitute our initial point of analysis. Thereafter, in the next subsection, we will present 
our complete model with the inclusion of the Corporate Governance variables by 
estimating equations (4.3) and (4.4).  
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 exhibit regressions results for both ETR1 and ETR2, 
respectively. As previously explained, these two tax variables only differ in the 
denominator’s choice. ETR1 is computed by using pre-tax income in the denominator. 
Alternatively, ETR2 is calculated using cash flow from operations as denominator. We 
expect the results on ETR2 to be more reliable because through the use of cash flow from 
operations we can control for different accounting methods related to firm size 
(Zimmerman, 1983). Regression coefficient for the variable SIZE evidence a positive and 
significant association with ETR1 (β=0.0467, t=26.3377) and, as well, with ETR2 
(β=0.0300, t=10.9552). These results are consistent with previous findings of 
Zimmerman (1983), Rego (2003), Minick and Noga (2010) and Kraft (2014). Therefore, 
larger firms have higher corporate effective tax rate, which supports the political cost 
theory. This theory argues that high tax rates are a mean of wealth transfer to State in 
order to redistribute it to social groups. They are also a proxy of firms’ success. These 
results are consistent with hypothesis H1a as there is a significant relationship between 
SIZE and ETR1 and between SIZE and ETR2. Regarding the influence of firms’ leverage 
on effective tax rate, we expect a negative coefficient. We find a positive and insignificant 
relationship between LEV and ETR1 (β= 0.0060, t=1.4193). Conversely, regarding the 
relationship between ETR2 and LEV we find a negative and significant coefficient (β=-
0.0105, t= -2.8509). This finding is consistent with the rationale that firms prefer debt 
financing rather than equity financing due to the interest deductibility associated to the 
former (Richardson and Lanis, 2007 and Kraft, 2014). For that reason, we can observe 
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that the debt tax shield associated to the choice of debt financing contributes to lower 
effective tax rate. Additionally, the discrepancy between the results achieved may be 
related to the computation of our tax variables. As explained above, ETR2 takes into 
consideration differences between dissimilar accounting methods. Therefore, concerning 
the relationship between the variables LEV and ETR2 we find support for our hypothesis 
H1b. To test the impact of firms’ investment decisions on ETRs we take into account 
firms’ asset structure. The first variable used to measure this effect is capital intensity, 
CAP_INT, which reveals a negative and significant coefficient in the first regression (β=-
0.0828, t=-8.7957) and, also, in the second one (β=-0.1103, t= -6.6256). These results 
are consistent with hypothesis H1c supporting that more capital intensive firms have a 
lower effective tax rate as a result of the deductibility of depreciations and amortizations 
expenses. Such evidence is in line with the findings of Gupta and Newberry (1997), 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) and Rodríguez and Arias (2014). On the opposite side of 
capital intensity, there are researchers who argue that inventory intensity exhibits a 
substitution effect to capital intensity. Therefore, we propose a positive sign for the 
coefficient of INV_INT. In fact, our results support our prediction, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between inventory intensity and ETR1 (β=0.0819, t=4.8444) and 
between INV_INT and ETR2 (β=0.1266, t=4.4173). Our results are consistent with those 
of Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Richardson and Lanis (2007) but not with Derashid 
and Zhang (2003) that do not find a significant relationship between inventory intensity 
and ETR. As a result, our hypothesis H1d is corroborated. Another important component 
of investment decisions, also studied by authors like Gupta and Newberry (1997) and 
Richardson and Lanis (2007), regards the investment on Research & Development. Since 
there are important fiscal incentives related to R&D expenses, it is expected a negative 
association between RD_INT and our tax variables. As expected, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient for RD_INT in the first regression (β=-0.0025, t=-31.8080). 
Concerning the variable ETR2 we also find a negative and significant relationship 
between ETR2 and RD_INT (β=-0.0013, t=-5.2534). These results confirm hypothesis 
H1e. Therefore, our hypotheses regarding asset mix variables are all corroborated. Our 
last hypothesis related to firms’ financial specific characteristics is about firms’ 
profitability. We use the variable ROA as a proxy for that indicator. Our results show a 
positive and significant relationship between firms’ profitability and ETR1 (β= 0.0022, 
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t= 8.6835). The results for ETR2 are in the same direction of the ones for ETR1 (β= 
0.0025, t= 9.7946). These positive associations are consistent with Richardson and Lanis 
(2007), Minick and Noga (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012). These can be simply 
explained for the reason that more profitable firms have higher earnings and, 
consequently, pay more taxes. However, Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Kraft (2014) 
find opposite results which can rely on the assumption that more profitable firms also 
have more resources to manage taxes in a reducing way. These results confirm our 
hypothesis H1f as we find a significant association between ROA and our two tax 
variables. In order to account for the influence of firms’ growth potential, we include the 
variable MB and we find a negative relationship between MB and ETR1 (β= -0.0020, t= 
-2.4833). This result is inconsistent with the one found by Derashid and Zhang (2003). 
These authors argue that firms with a higher market capitalization and, consequently, 
more growth potential, exhibit higher effective tax rate. Contrary to ETR1, we find 
support for this theory when we look to the relationship between MB and ETR2 
(β=0.0056, t=6.1741).  
Overall, except for firms’ leverage, all results found for relations between firms’ 
financial and operational characteristics and ETR1 are in line with our expectations. 
Moreover, we can observe an adjusted R-squared of 89.89%, which means that ETR1 
variation can be explained in almost 90% by our explanatory variables. Additionally, our 
estimation output presents a value for prob F-statistic of 0.000, thus our variables are 
jointly significant. Concerning the results of equation (4.2), all explanatory variables 
evidence the expected sign. Therefore, taking into consideration ETR2 as our tax variable, 
all our hypotheses about the influence of firms’ financial and operational specific 
characteristics are corroborated. This result evidences that the findings related to the 
second regression are more elucidative about the influence of firms’ financial and 
operational characteristics on ETRs. Regarding equation (2) we find that our data fits our 
model in 65.60% (adjusted R-squared). In addition, our regression is globally significant 
as prob F-statistic is equal to 0.000. Overall, we observe that firms’ financial specific 
characteristics have impact on effective tax rates.   
 In the next subsection we will analyse the influence of Corporate Governance 
attributes on effective tax rates. Therefore, equations (4.3) and (4.4) present our complete 
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model by including Corporate Governance variables in order to determine which factors 
can have a significant impact on ETRs. 
Table 6: Estimation results for the impact of firms’ financial and operational specific 
characteristics on ETRs 
  ETR1   ETR2 
Firm characteristics (1)   (2) 
  
 
 
C -0.0873*** 
 
-0.0536** 
 
(-4.4719) 
 
(-2.2553) 
    
SIZE 0.0467*** 
 
0.0300*** 
 
(26.3377) 
 
(10.9552) 
 
 
 
 
LEV 0.0060 
 
-0.0105*** 
 
(1.4193) 
 
(-2.8509) 
    
CAP_INT -0.0828*** 
 
-0.1103*** 
 
(-8.7957) 
 
(-6.6256) 
    
INV_INT 0.0819*** 
 
0.1266*** 
 
(4.8444) 
 
(4.4173) 
    
RD_INT -0.0025*** 
 
-0.0013*** 
 
(-31.8080) 
 
(-5.2534) 
    
ROA 0.0022*** 
 
0.0025*** 
 
(8.6835) 
 
(9.7946) 
    
MB -0.0020** 
 
0.0056*** 
 
(-2.4833) 
 
(6.1741) 
 
 
 
 
D_EARN 
 
-0.0634*** 
 
-0.0138 
 
(-4.8368) 
 
(-1.0655) 
 
 
 
 
    
Year dummies  YES 
 
YES 
    
R-squared 0.90022 
 
0.660426 
    
    
(Table 6 is continued in the next page)    
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Table 6 continued:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.898891 
 
0.655904 
    
F-statistic 677.4756 
 
146.0417 
    
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
    
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 838 
  
838 
 
Table 6 presents the estimation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) where the dependent variables are ETR1 or 
ETR2, respectively, and explanatory variables are firms’ financial and operational specific characteristics. 
ETR1 is computed as the ratio between total tax expense and pre-tax income. ETR2 is defined as the ratio 
between total tax expense and cash flow from operations. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV 
is long term debt divided by shareholders equity, CAP_INT is net property, plant and equipment scaled by 
total assets, INV_INT is total inventories divided by total assets, RD_INT is R&D expense scaled by total 
sales, ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets, MB is market capitalization divided by shareholders 
funds, D_EARN is a dummy variable equals to one if earnings before taxes are positive and zero otherwise. 
Both regressions were estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights with a fixed 
effect for time through the inclusion of year dummy variables. All independent variables were winsorized 
at 1% and 99%. * means 10% individual significance, ** means 5% individual significance and *** means 
1% individual significance. In parenthesis are observed t-statistic values.  
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5.1.2. Results for the influence of Corporate Governance 
Along with financial and operational indicators, Corporate Governance attributes 
may influence firms’ effective tax rates. Interactions between managers, shareholders, 
members of board of directors and stakeholders are decisive regarding investments’ 
choices. As a result, investments’ decisions influence ETRs due to their impact on firms’ 
financial specific characteristics. Also, managing taxes is a matter ever more relevant as 
it has impact on firms’ cash flow. Therefore, shareholders and board members, who may 
act in the best interest of the shareholders, can exert influence on the behaviour of 
effective tax rates through their governing decisions. With the objective of studying the 
effect of Corporate Governance attributes on ETRs, we estimate equations (4.3) and (4.4) 
using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights with a fixed effect model 
for time. These two models represent our complete model by combining firms’ financial 
and operational characteristics, which were analysed in the previous section, and 
Corporate Governance attributes.  
Table 7, columns 1 and 2, show regressions results for our tax variables, ETR1 
and ETR2, respectively, by taking into consideration both firms’ financial specific 
characteristics and Corporate Governance mechanisms. In relation to the firms’ specific 
characteristic, the results of column 1 and 2 are in line with those reported in Table 6. 
Therefore, all the coefficients exhibit the predicted sign, corroborating all hypotheses 
about this set of variables. This is particularly evident on column 2 of Table7 when we 
consider ETR2 as our proxy of effective tax rate. Regarding Corporate Governance 
variables, we distinguish between two different dimensions: ownership structure and 
board of directors’ composition. The agency theory consists on a well-studied conflict 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may pursue 
goals and investments that are not value maximizing only with the aim of achieving 
benefits to themselves (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). By this reason, ownership structure 
can contribute to attenuate or emphasize that conflict. The variable INS_OWN exhibits a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in relation to ETR1 (β=-0.0463, t=-
5.7126) and, as well, in relation to ETR2 (β=-0.0431, t=-3.7313). As control and 
ownership are usually separated, this gives potential to the existence of agency conflicts. 
Insider ownership helps to reduce this conflict as managers are also shareholders and, 
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therefore, they will be more averse to implement decisions or to invest in non-value 
maximizing activities. As lower effective tax rates contributes to higher net earnings and, 
consequently, to higher value to shareholders, the negative relationship found is 
consistent with this point of view. This interests’ alignment effect between managers and 
shareholders is also in accordance with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Florackis (2008). 
However, after a certain level of insider ownership we may have problems associated to 
the entrenchment effect as insider shareholders won’t be worried about the monitoring 
effect of non-managers shareholders. Ownership concentration is another related measure 
of ownership structure. This measure is present in our analysis through the variable 
OWN_CONC which shows a positive and significant relationship with ETR1 (β=0.0086, 
t=2.3409). Considering the results of column 2, we also find a positive and significant 
relationship between OWN_CONC and ETR2 (β=0.0120, t=2.2415). Bearing in mind 
the definition of our ownership concentration variable, OWN_CONC, we can conclude 
that firms with a less concentrated ownership structure exhibit higher effective tax rates. 
Many authors argue that high levels of ownership may induce shareholders to actively 
monitor managers since non-value maximizing decisions will have significant impact to 
majority shareholders. For that reason, ownership concentration acts as a mechanism to 
reduce agency conflicts. Conversely, our results show that more independent firms have 
higher effective tax rates. This can be explained due to the lack of incentive to minority 
shareholders actively monitor management actions and management’ efficiency. We 
should also keep in mind that our variable used to measure OWN_CONC has a threshold 
of 25% to categorize firms as independent or not. Most studies consider lower limits of 
concentration and, therefore, the conflicts of agency between minority and large 
shareholders may not be a problem in those studies. Our hypothesis H2 predicts the 
existence of an association between ownership structure and ETRs. Considering the 
results above explained, in relation to the variables INS_OWN and OWN_CONC, we 
find that our hypothesis is confirmed for both insider ownership and ownership 
concentration dimensions as there is a significant association between these variables and 
ETR1 and ETR2, respectively.  
We analyse the influence of Corporate Governance mechanisms on effective tax 
rates also through board of directors’ size and composition. The variable BOARD 
exhibits a positive and significant relationship with ETR1 (β=0.0015, t=4.9555). The 
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results related to ETR2 are in the same direction (β=0.0017, t=3.4213). These results 
mean that larger boards are associated with higher effective tax rates. One possible 
explanation is based on the assumption that as board size increases it is more difficult to 
achieve consensus between board members (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Board of directors 
should act as agents of shareholders (Adams et al., 2010). Therefore, in the presence of 
larger boards, as coordination becomes a problem, it is also more difficult to invest in 
activities that reduce ETRs. Considering these results, we find evidence to support our 
hypothesis H3a as there is a significant association between board size and effective tax 
rates, ETR1 and ETR2. Along with board dimension, the composition of board of 
directors is also an important attribute which can exert influence on ETRs. This attribute 
is measured by the variable NON_EXEC which exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship with ETR1 (β=0.0911, t=7.9499) and, also, with ETR2 (β=0.0581, 
t=3.7355). Our findings are contrary to extant literature. Minick and Noga (2010) and 
Lanis and Richardson (2011) find that more independent boards, with a higher proportion 
of non-executive board members, can manage taxes in a reducing way more effectively 
as they contribute to reduce conflicts of agency. This theory is supported by the argument 
that non-executive directors will defend shareholders’ interests more actively due to their 
experience and expertise. Thus, we do not find evidence to corroborate our hypothesis 
H3b that predict a negative coefficient to the variable NON_EXEC. However, our result 
is consistent with the argument that non-executive directors do not have incentives to 
actively monitor managers as they are less informed about firms’ policies and, therefore, 
they will prefer a passive role in order to avoid confronts with management team 
(Florackis, 2008).  
Both regressions have a prob F-statistic of 0.000 meaning that both models are 
globally significant. Therefore, equation (1) and (2) confirm the importance and influence 
of Corporate Governance mechanisms to determine effective tax rates. 
Overall, Table 6 and Table 7 show some of firms’ specific characteristics that may 
affect and determine firms’ effective tax rates. We find evidence about the influence of 
firms’ financial characteristics on ETRs. These characteristics are the result of managers’ 
investment decisions which may be motivated or not by the objective of lowering taxes. 
Therefore, indicators such as firms’ capital intensity and firms’ capital structure may 
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influence or be influenced by that objective. As investment decisions are to some extent 
dependent of managers’ discretion we should take into consideration the mechanisms that 
regulate and monitor relations between managers and shareholders. Our results support 
the relevance of Corporate Governance mechanisms to determine effective tax rates either 
by considering ownership structure or board of directors.  In summary, we observe that 
effective tax rates can be explained with regards to financial indicators and Corporate 
Governance attributes.  
Table 7: Estimation results for the impact of firms’ financial and operational specific 
characteristics and Corporate Governance on ETRs 
  ETR1  ETR2 
Firm characteristics (1)  (2) 
    
C -0.0069  0.0127 
 (-0.3035)  (0.4181) 
    
SIZE 0.0281***  0.0169*** 
 (11.1335)  (4.2898) 
    
LEV 0.0043  -0.0097** 
 (1.0182)  (-2.5692) 
    
CAP_INT -0.0904***  -0.1192*** 
 (-6.9722)  (-6.8911) 
    
INV_INT 0.1012***  0.1408*** 
 (4.6332)  (4.6431) 
    
RD_INT -0.0023***  -0.0015*** 
 (-14.4454)  (-6.6242) 
    
ROA 0.0017***  0.0024*** 
 (6.4355)  (9.0649) 
    
MB -0.0010  0.0043*** 
 (-1.4697)  (4.8847) 
    
D_EARN -0.0329**  -0.0039 
 (-2.3402)  (-0.3066) 
    
(Table 7 is continued in next page)    
39 
 
Table 7 continued:    
 
   
INS_OWN -0.0463***  -0.0431*** 
 (-5.7126)  (-3.7313) 
    
OWN_CONC 0.0086**  0.0120** 
 (2.3409)  (2.2415) 
    
BOARD 0.0015***  0.0017*** 
 (4.9555)  (3.4213) 
 
NON_EXEC 0.0911***  0.0581*** 
 (7.9499)  (3.7355) 
    
Year dummies YES  YES 
    
R-squared 0.779492  0.643316 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.775384  0.636669 
    
F-statistic 189.7112  96.7931 
    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  0.000000 
    
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 821  821 
     
 
Table 7 presents the estimation of equations (4.3) and (4.4) where the dependent variables are ETR1 or 
ETR2, respectively, and explanatory variables are firms’ financial specific characteristics and Corporate 
Governance characteristics. ETR1 is computed as the ratio between total tax expense and pre-tax income. 
ETR2 is defined as the ratio between total tax expense and cash flow from operations. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, LEV is long term debt divided by shareholders equity, CAP_INT is net property, 
plant and equipment scaled by total assets, INV_INT is total inventories divided by total assets, RD_INT 
is R&D expense scaled by total sales, ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets, MB is market 
capitalization divided by shareholders funds, D_EARN is a dummy variable equals to one if earnings before 
taxes are positive and zero otherwise, INS_OWN is closely held shares scaled by common shares 
outstanding, OWN_CONC is a dummy variable equals to one if no shareholder holds more than 25% of 
total shares outstanding and zero otherwise, BOARD is the number of current directors and NON_EXEC 
is the number of non-executive directors divided by total number of directors. Both regressions were 
estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights with a fixed effect for time through 
the inclusion of year dummy variables. All independent variables were winsorized at 1% and 99%. * means 
10% individual significance, ** means 5% individual significance and *** means 1% individual 
significance. In parenthesis are observed t-statistic values. 
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6. Conclusions 
 Corporate effective tax rate is ever more on the main agenda of managers when 
making their strategic decisions. The activities of tax reduction may contribute to 
important cash savings which will benefit shareholders and all remaining stakeholders. 
As a consequence, the analysis of investment decisions should take into consideration 
effective tax rate instead of the statutory tax rate. By this reason, this study provides some 
added value to existing literature by investigating how effective tax rates are affected by 
firms’ financial and operational characteristics and, moreover, by Corporate Governance 
mechanisms.  
 In order to examine what affects ETRs we use a sample of 704 firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange during the period 2010-2013. Our data is organized in a panel 
data structure. To measure effective ETRs we use two different variables. Our first ETR 
measure is obtained as the ratio between tax expense and pre-tax income. The second 
measure differs from the first because in the denominator we use cash flow from 
operations instead of pre-tax income.  
 Following a similar approach to Richardson and Lanis (2007) and Kraft (2014), 
we start our study by examining the impact of financial and operational indicators on 
ETRs. Our results show that larger firms have higher ETRs confirming the political cost 
theory (Zimmerman, 1983). Firms with a more capital intensive asset structure evidence 
lower effective tax rates due to the effect of depreciations. By reason of the substitution 
effect between capital intensity and inventory intensity, the latter evidences a positive 
impact on ETRs (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). The deductibility for tax purposes of R&D 
expenses also reduces ETRs. The tax shield associated to leverage also contributes to 
lower ETRs of more leveraged firms. Along with firms’ dimension, firms’ profitability 
has a positive influence on ETRs. 
 We further develop our model by studying the influence of Corporate Governance 
attributes on ETRs. Following a similar approach to the one of Minick and Noga (2010) 
we analyse the effect of ownership structure and board of directors’ composition on 
ETRs. We put together on our econometric models firms’ financial indicators and 
Corporate Governance measures. Corporate Governance can act as a controlling 
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mechanism to attenuate agency problems between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). We observe that a higher proportion of insider ownership 
contributes to lower ETRs corroborating the alignment effect attributed to managerial 
ownership. We also find that more independent firms, meaning those without the presence 
of controlling shareholders have less incentive to monitor managers actions and, 
therefore, these firms evidence higher ETRs. Regarding board of directors, our findings 
exhibit that larger boards are related to higher ETRs. This result can be explained because 
as the board size increases it is more difficult to achieve consensus opinions which 
weakens the monitoring power of the board of directors. Additionally, a higher number 
of non-executive board members contributes to increase ETRs. 
 Our research adds some insights to the extant literature by providing evidence 
about how and what affects and determines effective tax rates. Firstly, we use a different 
sample than the large majority of previous studies. Research studies based on the analysis 
of European firms are scarce. By focusing on non-financial firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange our results provide evidence on the impact of firms’ financial 
characteristics on ETRs. Moreover, we enlarge literature related to Corporate Governance 
and its influence on ETRs. We combine four Corporate Governance variables related to 
two different dimensions, ownership structure and board composition. In contrast with 
most of the studies, our variables have the advantage of being measured year by year. 
Particularly, the variable used to measure the ownership concentration is more ambitious 
than those of prior investigations as we do not account for participants smaller than one 
quarter to categorize a firm as independent or not from controlling shareholders. Our 
findings may be useful to tax researchers interested in studying effective tax rates and to 
their analysis of which factors can drive ETRs. Managers and investors are also interested 
in this study as effective tax rates influence firms performance and, consequently, may 
influence their remuneration and wealth. As well, policy makers, standard setters and 
regulators have to take into account the factors and indicators that impact ETRs on the 
analysis and definition of tax systems, thus our study contribute to their knowledge about 
it. Despite the significance of our results, our investigation has some limitations. Firstly, 
we are analysing a short sample period. Secondly, due to the sample period we use, we 
focus our research on current effective tax rate. It would be interesting if future research 
observed how long-run ETRs proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008) are influenced by the 
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same indicators using a similar sample. Another, improvement that can be made is related 
to the use of a measure of ETR capable of capturing tax avoidance activities such as cash 
effective tax rate.  
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7. Appendix 
 This appendix describes how we compute the variable used to measure 
concentration ownership, OWN_CONC. We base its computation on the Independence 
Indicator available at the Amadeus Database. This indicator represents the degree of 
independence of a company with regard to its shareholders. 
To each company is assigned a classification A, B, C, D or U according to the following 
rules: 
 A: if none of known recorded shareholders have more than 25% of total or direct 
ownership; "A" companies are called “Independent companies”. 
 B: if none of known recorded shareholders have a total or direct ownership 
percentage over 50% but there are one or more shareholders with an ownership 
percentage above 25%. 
 C: is attached to any company with a recorded shareholder with a total ownership 
over 50%. 
 D: is allocated to any company with a recorded shareholder with 
a direct ownership of over 50%. 
 U: is allocated to companies that do not fall into the categories A, B, C or D - 
indicating an “unknown” degree of independence. 
The variable OWN_CONC is equal to one if a company is classified as “A” and is equal 
to zero, otherwise. By this way, we consider the influence of independent companies on 
effective tax rates.  
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